-
1
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
No SLSA provenance
npm registry signatures
No source commit
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
parzhitsky
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Package name '-' is a deliberate placeholder; Levenshtein distance from single-char names is meaningless as a typosquat signal. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Same rationale — '-' is not a plausible typosquat of 'qs'. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Personal/skeleton project; tiny payload and missing metadata are expected for a private placeholder package. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 3 |
v0.0.1
1 finding
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.