7zip-bin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package's sole purpose is distributing precompiled 7-Zip binaries; bundled binaries are expected and intentional. | ai |
v5.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • linux/arm/7za • linux/arm64/7za • linux/ia32/7za • linux/x64/7za • mac/arm64/7za • mac/x64/7za • win/arm64/7za.exe • win/ia32/7za.exe • win/x64/7za.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • linux/arm/7za • linux/arm64/7za • linux/ia32/7za • linux/x64/7za • mac/arm64/7za • mac/x64/7za • win/ia32/7za.exe • win/x64/7za.exe
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.