@0xmonaco/core
⚠️ **EARLY DEVELOPMENT WARNING** ⚠️
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@0xmonaco/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep; likely re-exported transitively rather than directly imported in source. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped @0xmonaco/core is a legitimate SDK package, not a typosquat of cors; Levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.15 | 5 / 2 | |
| 1.0.14 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.7.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.6.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.5.9 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.5.4 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.3 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.2 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.4.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.3.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.15 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.14 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.13 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.12 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.11 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.10 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.9 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.8 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.5 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 5 |
v1.0.15
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
v1.0.14
1 finding[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (provenance): Provenance regression on a package that previously had CI attestations is a strong compromise signal; applies to this version.) This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.