@0xmonaco/mcp-server
MCP server for the Monaco SDK
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mintlify/openapi-types | AI (dependencies): @mintlify/openapi-types is a known Mintlify ecosystem package; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Absence of provenance is common; no other risk signals present for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/bin.js | AI (source-diff): dist/bin.js is a minified bun bundle per build script; long strings are viem/ethereum error messages, not malicious payloads. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:node-fetch | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled ESM output via bun build inlines deps; phantom detection is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@0xmonaco/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org bundled dep; inlined by bun build, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ws | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled ESM output via bun build inlines deps; phantom detection is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@modelcontextprotocol/sdk | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled ESM output via bun build inlines deps; phantom detection is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@0xmonaco/types | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org bundled dep; inlined by bun build, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled ESM output via bun build inlines deps; phantom detection is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:viem | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled ESM output via bun build inlines deps; phantom detection is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.2 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.6.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.5.9 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.5.8 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.5.7 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.5.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 6 / 0 |
v0.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.1
2 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.9
2 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.8
2 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (carsonfalcon) than the most recent previously approved version (besated) on 2025-11-07, but carsonfalcon is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.