@0xsequence/dapp-client-cli
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all versions; no other risk signals present. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decoding is part of a legitimate AES decryption routine (salt/iv/tag); not payload obfuscation. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.7 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.6 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.5 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 4 |
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.