@0xsquid/sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@release-it/conventional-changelog | AI (npm-metadata): Dev-only release tooling dependency; not shipped in dist, no runtime risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established SDK package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.13.0 | 12 / 28 | |
| 2.12.0 | 12 / 28 | |
| 2.11.0 | 12 / 28 | |
| 2.10.2 | 12 / 28 | |
| 2.10.1 | 12 / 28 | |
| 2.10.0 | 12 / 28 | |
| 2.9.5 | 12 / 28 |
v2.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.