@1sat/vault
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Local Swift build script for a native macOS Secure Enclave binding; consistent with package purpose across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 1 |
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsScript: ./swift/build.sh
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsScript: ./swift/build.sh
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
2 findingsScript: ./swift/build.sh
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.