@23blocks/block-rewards No license 25 versions

@23blocks/block-rewards

npm Repository Homepage

25

Versions

—

License

No

Install Scripts

Verified

Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

juan.pelaez

Keywords

23blockssdkrewardsloyaltycouponsbadgesgamification

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
provenance	publisher-changed	AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing is backed by SLSA provenance attestation; legitimate automation handoff.	ai	2026/05/09
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@swc/helpers	AI (phantom-deps): Known implicit runtime dependency of @nx/js:swc build executor; stable false positive for this package.	ai	2026/05/09
phantom-deps	phantom-dep:@23blocks/contracts	AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package used as a type/contract dependency; phantom-dep heuristic not applicable here.	ai	2026/05/09

Versions (showing 25 of 25)

Version	Deps	Published
4.0.4	3 / 0	2026-05-28
4.0.3	3 / 0	2026-05-27
4.0.2	3 / 0	2026-05-27
4.0.1	3 / 0	2026-03-03
4.0.0	3 / 0	2026-02-20
3.4.0	3 / 0	2026-02-17
3.3.0	3 / 0	2026-02-08
3.2.4	3 / 0	2026-02-07
3.2.3	3 / 0	2026-02-06
3.2.2	3 / 0	2026-01-20
3.2.1	3 / 0	2026-01-16
3.2.0	3 / 0	2026-01-04
3.1.1	3 / 0	2026-01-04
3.1.0	3 / 0	2026-01-01
3.0.1	3 / 0	2025-12-17
3.0.0	3 / 0	2025-12-17
2.1.0	3 / 0	2025-12-15
2.0.0	3 / 0	2025-12-15
1.0.4	3 / 0	2025-12-14
1.0.3	3 / 0	2025-12-14
1.0.2	3 / 0	2025-12-14
1.0.1	3 / 0	2025-12-14
1.0.0	3 / 0	2025-12-13
0.2.1	3 / 0	2025-12-13
0.1.0	3 / 0	2025-12-13

v4.0.4

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.0.3

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.0.2

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.0.1

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.0.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.4.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.3.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.2.4

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.2.3

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.2.2

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.2.1

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.2.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.1

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-01) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.1

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.1.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.4

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.3

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.2

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.1

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.0

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.1

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: juan.pelaez → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.0

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.