@3-/captcha-linux-arm64-musl
This is the **aarch64-unknown-linux-musl** binary for `@3-/captcha`
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA provenance attestation indicates legitimate CI automation, not compromise. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific napi-rs native addon; .node binary is the package's sole purpose, published with SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform sub-package in a multi-target napi-rs build; sparse metadata is expected for this pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.49 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.48 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.47 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.46 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.44 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.43 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.42 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.41 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.40 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.39 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.38 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.37 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.36 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.35 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.32 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.13 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.49
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.48
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.47
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.46
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.44
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.43
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.42
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.41
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.40
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.39
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.38
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.37
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.36
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.35
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.32
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • captcha.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.