@3mo/moddable-data-grid
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@3mo/flex | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org component; likely re-exported or used indirectly, stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@a11d/key-path | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files per finding; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@3mo/icon-button | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org component; likely re-exported or used indirectly, stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.2 | 18 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 18 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 18 / 0 | |
| 0.3.1 | 18 / 0 |
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.