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Checkout flow module for 86d commerce platform

17
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

imsanchez

Keywords

commercecheckout86d

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher is backed by SLSA provenance attestation; legitimate automation pattern. ai
semgrep semgrep:etc-passwd-access AI (semgrep): Fires on a test asserting path traversal to /etc/passwd returns null — defensive test, not malicious access. ai

Versions (showing 17 of 17)

Version Deps Published
0.0.40 1 / 5
0.0.30 1 / 5
0.0.26 1 / 5
0.0.25 1 / 5
0.0.24 1 / 5
0.0.23 1 / 5
0.0.22 1 / 5
0.0.21 1 / 5
0.0.19 1 / 5
0.0.18 1 / 5
0.0.17 1 / 5
0.0.16 1 / 5
0.0.14 1 / 5
0.0.13 1 / 5
0.0.6 1 / 5
0.0.4 1 / 4
0.0.3 1 / 4

v0.0.40

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.30

2 findings
HIGH etc-passwd-access: src/__tests__/controllers.test.ts:248 semgrep

Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux Source: https://github.com/86d-app/86d/blob/f5c3606cdb3fd160b7cda8b1375e0aa40aec6b12/src/__tests__/controllers.test.ts#L248 246 | 247 | it("returns null for id with special characters", async () => { > 248 | expect(await controller.getById("../../../etc/passwd")).toBeNull(); 249 | }); 250 |

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.26

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.25

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.24

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.23

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.22

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.21

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.19

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.18

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.17

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.16

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.14

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.13

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.6

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: imsanchez → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.