@acala-network/eth-providers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo sub-package; missing metadata is a style choice, not a spam/malware signal for this established org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:graphql | AI (phantom-deps): graphql is a declared runtime dep used via graphql-request; phantom-dep heuristic fires but it's a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@acala-network/contracts | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; phantom-dep heuristic is unreliable for ABI/type-only imports common in blockchain packages. | ai |
v2.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.