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@accesslint/mcp

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MCP server for accessible agentic coding — WCAG audit tools for AI coding agents

18
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

ckundo

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@accesslint/chrome AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep declared in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic fires because it's not directly imported at the top level. ai
provenance slsa-provenance AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; stable positive signal for this package. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@accesslint/cli AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same AccessLint org/monorepo; stable false positive for this package. ai
publish-pattern rapid-publish AI (publish-pattern): CI/CD automated publishing with SLSA provenance; rapid publish is expected in this workflow. ai
source-diff source-size-dropped AI (source-diff): Size drop explained by extraction of logic into @accesslint/core dependency; not a stub/redirect. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA provenance; consistent with legitimate automation migration. ai
publish-pattern new-deps-added AI (publish-pattern): chrome-launcher and chrome-remote-interface are legitimate, established browser automation deps appropriate for an accessibility audit tool. ai
typosquat typosquat.levenshtein:yup AI (typosquat): Scoped @accesslint package; Levenshtein match to 'yup' is coincidental, not impersonation. ai

Versions (showing 18 of 18)

Version Deps Published
0.9.0 5 / 8
0.8.1 6 / 9
0.8.0 6 / 9
0.7.2 6 / 9
0.7.1 6 / 9
0.7.0 5 / 9
0.6.1 4 / 8
0.6.0 4 / 8
0.4.1 4 / 8
0.4.0 4 / 8
0.3.0 4 / 8
0.2.6 4 / 8
0.2.4 4 / 6
0.2.3 4 / 2
0.2.2 4 / 2
0.2.1 4 / 2
0.2.0 4 / 2
0.1.0 1 / 3

v0.9.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.8.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.8.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ckundo → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ckundo → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ckundo → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ckundo → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ckundo → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.