@accordproject/concerto-core
Core Implementation for the Concerto Modeling Language
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable for this package going forward. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): High-volume monorepo package; version gaps are expected, not indicative of takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@accordproject/concerto-metamodel | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same accordproject org; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@accordproject/concerto-codegen | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; declared in package.json as a runtime dep even if not directly imported in source. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.4 | 12 / 39 | |
| 4.1.3 | 12 / 39 | |
| 4.1.2 | 12 / 39 | |
| 4.1.0 | 11 / 38 | |
| 4.0.3 | 11 / 38 | |
| 4.0.2 | 11 / 38 | |
| 4.0.1 | 12 / 38 | |
| 4.0.0 | 12 / 38 | |
| 3.26.0 | 12 / 24 | |
| 3.25.7 | 12 / 24 | |
| 3.25.6 | 12 / 24 | |
| 3.25.5 | 12 / 24 | |
| 3.25.4 | 12 / 24 | |
| 3.25.3 | 12 / 24 | |
| 3.25.0 | 12 / 24 |
v4.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.