@accordproject/concerto-cto
Parser for Concerto CTO files
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD; confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation on the same version. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD publish; established org package with 573 versions makes account takeover unlikely. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@accordproject/concerto-metamodel | AI (dependencies): Same org scope (@accordproject); alpha versioning is expected for coordinated releases within this monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:acorn | AI (phantom-deps): acorn is a declared runtime dep used in webpack config; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:schema-utils | AI (phantom-deps): schema-utils is a declared runtime dep used in webpack config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@accordproject/concerto-codegen | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for transitive/indirect usage within monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.4 | 5 / 26 | |
| 4.1.3 | 5 / 26 | |
| 4.1.2 | 5 / 26 | |
| 4.1.0 | 5 / 26 | |
| 4.0.3 | 5 / 26 | |
| 4.0.2 | 5 / 26 | |
| 4.0.1 | 6 / 26 | |
| 4.0.0 | 5 / 27 | |
| 3.26.0 | 2 / 12 | |
| 3.25.7 | 2 / 12 | |
| 3.25.6 | 2 / 12 | |
| 3.25.5 | 2 / 12 | |
| 3.25.4 | 2 / 12 | |
| 3.25.0 | 2 / 12 |
v4.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.