@accordproject/concerto-vocabulary
Associate human-readable text to model declarations
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): accordproject migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA attestation; publisher change is expected and verified. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation via GitHub Actions CI/CD confirms legitimate publish; mitigates account-takeover concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@accordproject/concerto-codegen | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dependency in same org scope; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.5 | 2 / 23 | |
| 4.1.4 | 2 / 23 | |
| 4.1.3 | 2 / 23 | |
| 4.1.2 | 2 / 23 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 23 | |
| 4.0.3 | 2 / 23 | |
| 4.0.2 | 2 / 23 | |
| 4.0.1 | 3 / 23 | |
| 4.0.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 3.26.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 3.25.7 | 2 / 11 | |
| 3.25.6 | 2 / 11 | |
| 3.25.5 | 2 / 11 | |
| 3.25.0 | 2 / 11 |
v4.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.