@actions/languageserver
Language server for GitHub Actions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions org account is legitimate for this github.com/actions/* package; SLSA provenance confirms CI-built. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer ericsciple is a known GitHub Actions team member; org-level transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of prior maintainers consistent with org account consolidation under GitHub Actions. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by org migration is expected; SLSA provenance rules out silent takeover. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/cli.bundle.cjs | AI (source-diff): Standard esbuild bundle output; build script in package.json explicitly produces this file. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/cli.bundle.cjs | AI (source-diff): Network calls and dynamic require are part of bundled vscode-languageserver; not dropper behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by addition of esbuild CLI bundle; expected for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@octokit/types | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only dependency; not directly imported at runtime, stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 40 of 40)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.55 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.54 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.53 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.52 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.51 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.50 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.49 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.48 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.47 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.46 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.45 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.3.44 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.43 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.42 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.41 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.40 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.39 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.38 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.37 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.36 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.35 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.34 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.33 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.32 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.31 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.30 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.29 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.28 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.27 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.26 | 7 / 13 | |
| 0.3.25 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.24 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.23 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.22 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.21 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.20 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.19 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.18 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.17 | 7 / 12 | |
| 0.3.16 | 7 / 12 |
v0.3.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.52
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.51
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.50
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.49
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.48
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.47
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.46
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.45
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.41
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.39
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.38
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.27
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.26
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.