@acusti/date-picker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@acusti/styling | AI (dependencies): Same-author monorepo sibling package; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all 33 versions; author has not adopted Sigstore attestation but package is otherwise clean. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.16.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 0.15.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 0.14.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 0.12.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 0.11.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 0.10.1 | 2 / 9 |
v0.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.