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@adobe/spacecat-shared-launchdarkly-client

12
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

marbectripodgarthdblazdadobe-adminpatrickfultontrieloffshazronkrisnyedcpfsdknatebaldwindevongovettaspro83symanovidpfisterstefan-guggisbergrofekptdobeadobehallsfullcolorcoderdjaeggidylandepassmhaackamol-anandstopp-adobedotenduh_schmidtasthabh23zdahbituicufmeschbe

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Adobe packages routinely migrate to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD origin. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Adobe org packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this publisher. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@adobe/helix-universal AI (phantom-deps): Same-org Adobe dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for transitive/type-only imports in this package. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@adobe/spacecat-shared-utils AI (phantom-deps): Same-org Adobe dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for transitive/type-only imports in this package. ai

Versions (showing 12 of 12)

Version Deps Published
1.2.1 3 / 7
1.2.0 3 / 7
1.1.2 3 / 7
1.1.1 3 / 7
1.1.0 3 / 7
1.0.6 3 / 7
1.0.5 3 / 7
1.0.4 3 / 7
1.0.3 3 / 7
1.0.2 3 / 7
1.0.1 3 / 7
1.0.0 3 / 7

v1.2.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adobe-admin → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.1.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.6

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.5

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.