@aegis-scan/scanners
AEGIS scanner registry — 41 built-in regex checkers + 1 AST cross-file taint analyzer + 20 external-tool wrappers (16 SAST/DAST: Semgrep, Gitleaks, Trivy, ZAP, …; +1 passive subdomain-recon: Subfinder; +3 LLM-agent pentest: Strix, PTAI, Pentest-Swarm-AI —
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/quality/csp-evaluator.js | AI (source-diff): File reads local config files only; no actual network calls or dynamic eval in the sample — legitimate CSP scanner logic. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package explicitly configures provenance:true and publishes via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation consistently. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Small/new package without CI provenance setup; no other risk signals present. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Monorepo sub-package; no description is a style choice, not a malware indicator here. | ai |
Versions (showing 42 of 42)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.19.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.20 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.19 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.18 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.17 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.16 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.15 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.14 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.13 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.12 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.11 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.10 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.9 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.8 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.7 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.6 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.18.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.17.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.16.6 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.16.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.16.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.16.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.16.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.16.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.15.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.15.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.15.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.15.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.13.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.12.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.12.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.11.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.11.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.10.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.9.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.9.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.9.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.9.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.7.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.7.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 3 |
v0.19.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.20
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.19
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.18
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.17
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.16
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.15
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.14
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.13
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.12
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.11
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.10
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.9
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.8
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.7
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.6
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.5
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.4
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.6
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.5
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.5
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.5
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ridematch1.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.