@ag-ui/core
TypeScript definitions & runtime schemas for the **Agent-User Interaction (AG-UI) Protocol**.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package has no install scripts, no obfuscation, and clean content. Lack of Sigstore provenance is a low-severity hygiene issue, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @ag-ui/core is not a typosquat of 'cors'. The Levenshtein match is a false positive due to the scoped namespace convention. Stable across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:rxjs | AI (phantom-deps): rxjs is a declared runtime dependency in package.json; the phantom-dep finding is a false positive likely due to indirect usage or re-export patterns. | ai |
Versions (showing 29 of 29)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.55 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.54 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.53 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.52 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.51 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.50 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.49 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.0.48 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.47 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.46 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.45 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.44 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.43 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.42 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.41 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.40 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.39 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.38 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.37 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.36 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.35 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.34 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.33 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.32 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.31 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.30 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.29 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.28 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.27 | 2 / 5 |
v0.0.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.54
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.53
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.52
2 findingsPackage name '@ag-ui/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.51
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.50
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.49
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.48
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.46
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.45
2 findingsPackage name '@ag-ui/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.44
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.43
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.42
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.41
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.