@agent-assistant/inbox
Bounded inbox primitives for trusted external inputs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from human account to GitHub Actions CI/CD bot, accompanied by a SLSA provenance attestation — this is a legitimate and recommended supply chain hardening transition for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Part of an active monorepo (@agent-assistant) with 25 published versions and SLSA provenance. Missing README polish and keywords are cosmetic, not security signals. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@agent-assistant/turn-context | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same @agent-assistant scoped monorepo; internal dependency relationship is expected and consistent across the namespace. | ai |
Versions (showing 60 of 60)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.35 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.33 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.32 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.31 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.30 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.29 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.28 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.27 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.26 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.25 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.24 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.23 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.22 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.21 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.20 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.19 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.18 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.17 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.16 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.15 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.14 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.13 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.12 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.11 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.10 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.9 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.24 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.23 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.22 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.21 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.20 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.19 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.18 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.17 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.16 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.15 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.14 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.13 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.12 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.11 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.10 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.9 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 2 |
v0.4.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.