@agentage/mcp
MCP shim for the Agentage daemon — stdio ⟷ HTTP proxy exposing agentage agents as MCP tools
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped MCP proxy package; no functional or naming relationship to 'yup'. Edit-distance match is coincidental. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): zod is a declared runtime dependency used in compiled dist output; phantom-dep heuristic misses compiled imports. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 12 |
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.