@agentskit/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped AI-agent runtime package; name similarity to 'cors' is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.12.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.12.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.12.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.12.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.12.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.12.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.11.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.10.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.10.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.10.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.10.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.10.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.10.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.9.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.8.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.7.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.7.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.6.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 5 |
v1.12.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (emersonbraun) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.12.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (emersonbraun) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.12.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.