@agentskit/eval
Agent evaluation and benchmarking for AgentsKit.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Common for new packages; no other risk signals present to elevate this. | ai |
Versions (showing 28 of 28)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 0.4.19 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.4.18 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.17 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.16 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.15 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.14 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.13 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.12 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.11 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.10 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.9 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 4 |
v0.5.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (emersonbraun) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.