@agentskit/skills
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm packages); no other risk signals present to elevate this. | ai |
Versions (showing 28 of 28)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.16 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.15 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.14 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.13 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.12 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.11 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.10 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.9 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.8 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.7 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.6 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.8.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.7.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.5.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.8 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.6 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 3 |
v0.9.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (emersonbraun) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.8.16
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (emersonbraun) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.8.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.