@agentskit/vue
Vue 3 composable + components for AgentsKit.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:vite | AI (typosquat): Scoped @agentskit/vue package; not a typosquat of vite — different namespace and purpose. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped @agentskit/vue package; not a typosquat of yup — different namespace and purpose. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.4.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.7 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 5 |
v0.5.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (emersonbraun) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (emersonbraun) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.