@agentuity/pi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Org-internal package with consistent publisher; missing gitHead likely reflects a CI/build environment change, not tampering. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @agentuity/server is a same-org sibling dep pinned to the same version; not a suspicious third-party addition. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal monorepo plugin; sparse metadata is expected, not indicative of spam. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent pattern across this package's versions; no CI provenance configured. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@agentuity/aigateway | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; likely re-exported or used indirectly through @agentuity/adapter. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @agentuity package; 'pi' refers to Pi coding agent integration, not a typosquat of 'pg'. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pino | AI (typosquat): Scoped @agentuity package; Levenshtein match is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @agentuity package; Levenshtein match is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped @agentuity package; Levenshtein match is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:hapi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @agentuity package; Levenshtein match is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 58)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.14 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.13 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.12 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.11 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.10 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.9 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.8 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.7 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.1.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.12 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.11 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.10 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.9 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.8 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.7 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.30 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.29 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.28 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.27 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.26 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.25 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.24 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.23 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.22 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.21 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.20 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.19 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.18 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.17 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.0.16 | 2 / 4 | |
| 1.0.36 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.35 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.34 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.33 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.32 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.31 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.30 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.29 | 0 / 5 |
v3.1.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.10
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jhaynie) than the most recent previously approved version (huijiro) on 2026-07-20, but jhaynie is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1.9
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (huijiro) than the most recent previously approved version (jhaynie) on 2026-07-08, but huijiro is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jhaynie) than the most recent previously approved version (huijiro) on 2026-07-06, but jhaynie is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (huijiro) than the most recent previously approved version (jhaynie) on 2026-07-03, but huijiro is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jhaynie) than the most recent previously approved version (huijiro) on 2026-07-02, but jhaynie is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.1.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (huijiro) than the most recent previously approved version (p0tofpie) on 2026-06-29, but huijiro is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.30
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (p0tofpie) than the most recent previously approved version (huijiro) on 2026-06-25, but p0tofpie is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.