@agentuity/react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): p0tofpie is an established Agentuity publisher (1307 approved packages); transition appears to be an internal org handoff. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent across all versions of this internal SDK package; not a malware signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Part of @agentuity monorepo; missing metadata is a style choice, not a spam indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 207)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.46 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.45 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.44 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.43 | 1 / 1 |
v0.0.46
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.45
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.