@agnishc/edb-explore
Pi extension: explore_dir tool — sub-agent directory search that keeps results out of main context
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): env spread used in spawn() to pass environment to child process — normal pattern for CLI tooling, not exfiltration. | ai |
v0.4.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/agnishcc/pi-extention-monorepo/blob/91e03a14cb162db5272dd9ccd55cc11473be3514/src/runner.ts#L24 22 | const child = spawn(cmd, args, { 23 | cwd, > 24 | env: { ...process.env }, 25 | stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"], 26 | });
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/agnishcc/pi-extention-monorepo/blob/d0d25df0a116b88dbdb1744216348ce11d576649/src/runner.ts#L24 22 | const child = spawn(cmd, args, { 23 | cwd, > 24 | env: { ...process.env }, 25 | stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"], 26 | });
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.