@agora-js/shared
internal utils shared across @agora-js packages
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Agora publishes a large family of @agora-js/* scoped packages; mass-production and sparse README signals are expected for this internal utility package and are stable false positives. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.24.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.24.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.24.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.24.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.24.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.23.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.23.3 | 2 / 0 |
v4.24.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.24.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.23.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.23.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.