@agoric/internal
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Used in test helper to spawn AVA child processes; passing process.env to subprocesses is standard and intentional here. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get is idiomatic in SES/Hardened JS contexts where direct property access may be intercepted; not obfuscation. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.0 | 15 / 6 |
v0.4.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 50 | new Promise((resolve, reject) => { 51 | const ps = spawn('ava', [self, '-m', SUBTEST_PREFIX + name], { > 52 | env: { 53 | ...process.env, 54 | [AVA_EXPECT_UNHANDLED_REJECTIONS]: `${expectedUnhandled}`,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.