@ahkohd/omni-linux-x64-gnu
Prebuilt binaries for @ahkohd/omni (linux x64 glibc)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package is explicitly a prebuilt binary distribution for @ahkohd/omni; binaries are the intended payload, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary stub packages legitimately lack deps, keywords, and detailed READMEs. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.29 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.28 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.27 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.26 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.25 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.24 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.23 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.22 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.21 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.20 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.19 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.18 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.27
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.26
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.25
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.24
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.23
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.22
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.19
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.18
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.16
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/omni • bin/omni-transcribe-ui • bin/omni-ui-tail
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.