@ai-rpg-engine/cli
AI RPG Engine developer CLI: run, validate, replay, inspect, scaffold
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Manual-to-CI/CD provenance improvement, not a compromise indicator. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-rpg-engine/starter-template | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package, likely used indirectly via templating, not a real concern. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped monorepo package @ai-rpg-engine/cli; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-rpg-engine/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; likely re-exported or used transitively in CLI tooling. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-rpg-engine/modules | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; same rationale as @ai-rpg-engine/core. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-rpg-engine/content-schema | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; same rationale as @ai-rpg-engine/core. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.1 | 19 / 0 | |
| 3.3.0 | 19 / 0 | |
| 3.2.1 | 19 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 19 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 19 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 19 / 0 | |
| 2.9.0 | 19 / 0 | |
| 2.8.0 | 19 / 0 | |
| 2.7.0 | 18 / 0 | |
| 2.6.0 | 18 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.0.9 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.0.8 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.0.7 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.0.6 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.0.5 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.0.4 | 16 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 13 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 13 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 13 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 0 |
v3.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mikefrilot) on 2026-07-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.