@ai-rpg-engine/modules
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Young monorepo package; lack of provenance is common and no other risk signals present. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@ai-rpg-engine/core | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo package; unvetted status is expected for this ecosystem's internal deps. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@ai-rpg-engine/content-schema | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo package; unvetted status is expected for this ecosystem's internal deps. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@ai-rpg-engine/character-profile | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo package; unvetted status is expected for this ecosystem's internal deps. | ai |
Versions (showing 48 of 48)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.3.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.2.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.9.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.8.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.7.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.6.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.3.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.3.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.3.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.3.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.14 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.13 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.0.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 0 |
v3.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mikefrilot) on 2026-07-08, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.