@ai-sdk/amazon-bedrock
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are part of Vercel's AI SDK team; package is published by vercel-release-bot with strong track record. Team changes are expected for an active Vercel project. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of jaredpalmer reflects normal Vercel team evolution; vercel-release-bot remains the publisher with consistent approval history. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): vercel-release-bot is a well-established trusted publisher; absence of Sigstore provenance is a minor gap, not a risk signal for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:aws4fetch | AI (dependencies): aws4fetch is a legitimate, widely-used AWS Signature V4 signing library for fetch-based/edge environments. Its use here is architecturally appropriate as a replacement for @aws-sdk/client-bedrock-runtime. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 155)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.113 | 7 / 6 | |
| 4.0.112 | 7 / 6 | |
| 4.0.111 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.110 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.109 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.108 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.107 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.106 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.105 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.104 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.103 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.101 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.100 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.99 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.98 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.97 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.96 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.86 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.85 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.83 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.82 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.81 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.80 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.79 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.78 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.77 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.76 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.75 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.74 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.73 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.72 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.71 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.70 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.69 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.68 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.67 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.66 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.65 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.64 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.63 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.62 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.61 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.60 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.59 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.58 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.57 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.56 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.55 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.54 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.53 | 6 / 6 | |
| 4.0.52 | 6 / 6 |
v4.0.113
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.112
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.111
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.110
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.109
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.108
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.107
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.106
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.105
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.104
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.103
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.101
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.100
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.99
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.98
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.96
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.86
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.85
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.83
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.82
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.81
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.80
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.79
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.78
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.77
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.76
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.75
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.74
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.73
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.72
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.71
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.70
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.69
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.68
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.67
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.66
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.65
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.64
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.63
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.61
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.59
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.58
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.57
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.56
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.55
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.54
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.53
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.52
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.