@aiready/hygiene-audit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:preinstall | AI (install-scripts): Script only creates dist dir and empty cli.js stub to satisfy bin entry; no network access or arbitrary code execution. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:chalk | AI (phantom-deps): chalk is a declared runtime dep used by the CLI; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): commander is a declared runtime dep used by the CLI; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai |
v0.8.1
2 findingsScript: mkdir -p dist && touch dist/cli.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.