@ajna-inc/signing
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped org package with coherent signing-focused deps; missing metadata is a hygiene issue, not a malice indicator. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@noble/curves | AI (phantom-deps): @noble/curves is listed as a runtime dep in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.6.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.1.6 | 9 / 5 | |
| 0.1.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 4 |
v0.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.