@akinon/ui-alert
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal scoped UI component library; missing metadata is consistent across all akinon packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable pattern across akinon scoped packages; not a malware indicator here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across akinon package family; consistent with their publishing workflow. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.12 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.2.11 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.2.10 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.2.9 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.2.8 | 4 / 5 |
v1.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.