@akinon/ui-date-picker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal scoped org package; missing metadata is consistent across all @akinon packages, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable pattern across @akinon scoped packages; not indicative of malice. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.2 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.5.1 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.4.9 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.4.8 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.4.4 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.4.3 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.3.0 | 6 / 6 |
v1.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.