@akinon/ui-tabs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Akinon internal component; missing description is a stable pattern across their packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Akinon's internal UI component packages consistently lack public metadata; not indicative of spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.12 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.0.8 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 5 |
v1.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.