@alfalab/core-components-portal
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Org-internal maintainer rotation within @alfalab; published by trusted bot with strong track record. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Paired with maintainer-added; consistent with routine org handoff, not a takeover signal. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @alfalab/core-components-shared is a same-org package; low risk for this ecosystem. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard TypeScript runtime helper; implicit dependency pattern is stable for this package. | ai |
v5.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.