@alfalab/core-components-shared
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known implicit TypeScript runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all 66 versions of this package; no provenance is the norm for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 5 / 0 |
v2.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.