@alfresco/adf-content-services
Alfresco ADF content services
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): Known implicit runtime/binary dependency, stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.4.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.0.2 | 1 / 0 |
v9.0.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (alfresco) on 2026-02-25, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.