@alicloud/appstream-center20210903
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Alibaba Cloud SDK packages consistently lack repo/homepage metadata; pattern is stable across the SDK family. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.7 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.0.6 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.0.5 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.0.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.0.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.0.2 | 2 / 5 |
v2.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.