@alicloud/push20160801
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Auto-generated Alibaba Cloud SDK; missing repo/keywords/readme is a known pattern across this entire SDK family. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 5 |
v3.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.