@alicloud/searchplat20240529
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Auto-generated Alibaba Cloud SDK package; sparse metadata is a known pattern across this publisher's packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 2.5.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 2.5.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 2.4.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 2.3.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 2.2.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 5 |
v2.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.