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@aliou/pi-guardrails

npm Repository Homepage
37
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

aliou

Keywords

pi-packagepi-extensionpiguardrailssecurity

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance missing-githead AI (provenance): GitHub Actions CI publish via SLSA attestation replaces gitHead as the source-commit link; expected for this workflow. ai
semgrep semgrep:etc-passwd-access AI (semgrep): Reference appears in a test fixture string testing that the guardrail correctly handles /etc/passwd access patterns. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA/Sigstore attestation from the package's own repo — expected CI/CD publishing pattern. ai
semgrep semgrep:ssh-key-access AI (semgrep): Patterns appear in a guardrails deny-list config (enabled: false) to block SSH key access, not to harvest credentials. ai
semgrep semgrep:credential-dir-access AI (semgrep): Same context: deny-list pattern in a security guardrails config, not credential harvesting code. ai

Versions (showing 37 of 37)

Version Deps Published
0.13.1 2 / 12
0.13.0 2 / 12
0.12.1 2 / 12
0.12.0 2 / 12
0.11.2 2 / 11
0.11.1 2 / 11
0.11.0 2 / 11
0.10.0 2 / 10
0.9.5 2 / 10
0.9.4 2 / 10
0.9.3 2 / 10
0.9.2 2 / 10
0.9.1 2 / 10
0.9.0 2 / 10
0.8.0 2 / 10
0.7.7 2 / 8
0.7.6 2 / 8
0.7.5 2 / 8
0.7.4 2 / 0
0.7.3 2 / 0
0.7.2 2 / 0
0.7.1 2 / 0
0.7.0 2 / 0
0.6.1 2 / 0
0.6.0 2 / 0
0.5.4 0 / 0
0.5.3 0 / 0
0.5.2 0 / 0
0.5.1 0 / 0
0.5.0 0 / 0
0.4.1 0 / 0
0.4.0 0 / 0
0.3.0 0 / 0
0.2.1 0 / 0
0.2.0 0 / 0
0.1.0 0 / 0
0.0.1 0 / 0

v0.13.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.13.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.12.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.12.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.11.2

3 findings
HIGH etc-passwd-access: src/utils/bash-paths.test.ts:41 semgrep

Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 39 | it("ignores interpreter inline code", async () => { 40 | const result = await extractBashPathCandidates( > 41 | "python3 -c 'open(\"/etc/passwd\").read()'", 42 | CWD, 43 | );

HIGH etc-passwd-access: src/utils/command-args.test.ts:68 semgrep

Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 66 | 67 | it("ignores interpreter inline code", () => { > 68 | expect(tokens("python3", ["-c", 'open("/etc/passwd")'])).toEqual([]); 69 | }); 70 |

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.11.1

7 findings
HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:261 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 259 | enabled: false, 260 | patterns: [ > 261 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, 262 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 263 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" },

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:262 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 260 | patterns: [ 261 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, > 262 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 263 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, 264 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" },

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:263 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 261 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, 262 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, > 263 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, 264 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 265 | ],

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:264 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 262 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 263 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, > 264 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 265 | ], 266 | allowedPatterns: [{ pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pub" }],

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:266 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 264 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 265 | ], > 266 | allowedPatterns: [{ pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pub" }], 267 | protection: "noAccess", 268 | onlyIfExists: true,

HIGH credential-dir-access: src/config.ts:292 semgrep

Accessing credential directories suggests credential harvesting 290 | enabled: false, 291 | patterns: [ > 292 | { pattern: "~/.gnupg/**" }, 293 | { pattern: "~/*.gpg" }, 294 | { pattern: "~/.gpg-agent.conf" },

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.11.0

7 findings
HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:253 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 251 | enabled: false, 252 | patterns: [ > 253 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, 254 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 255 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" },

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:254 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 252 | patterns: [ 253 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, > 254 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 255 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, 256 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" },

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:255 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 253 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, 254 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, > 255 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, 256 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 257 | ],

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:256 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 254 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 255 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, > 256 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 257 | ], 258 | allowedPatterns: [{ pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pub" }],

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:258 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 256 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 257 | ], > 258 | allowedPatterns: [{ pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pub" }], 259 | protection: "noAccess", 260 | onlyIfExists: true,

HIGH credential-dir-access: src/config.ts:284 semgrep

Accessing credential directories suggests credential harvesting 282 | enabled: false, 283 | patterns: [ > 284 | { pattern: "~/.gnupg/**" }, 285 | { pattern: "~/*.gpg" }, 286 | { pattern: "~/.gpg-agent.conf" },

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.10.0

7 findings
HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:234 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 232 | enabled: false, 233 | patterns: [ > 234 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, 235 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 236 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" },

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:235 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 233 | patterns: [ 234 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, > 235 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 236 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, 237 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" },

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:236 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 234 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/**" }, 235 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, > 236 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, 237 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 238 | ],

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:237 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 235 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_rsa" }, 236 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*_ed25519" }, > 237 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 238 | ], 239 | allowedPatterns: [{ pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pub" }],

HIGH ssh-key-access: src/config.ts:239 semgrep

Accessing SSH keys — strong indicator of credential theft 237 | { pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pem" }, 238 | ], > 239 | allowedPatterns: [{ pattern: "~/.ssh/*.pub" }], 240 | protection: "noAccess", 241 | onlyIfExists: true,

HIGH credential-dir-access: src/config.ts:265 semgrep

Accessing credential directories suggests credential harvesting 263 | enabled: false, 264 | patterns: [ > 265 | { pattern: "~/.gnupg/**" }, 266 | { pattern: "~/*.gpg" }, 267 | { pattern: "~/.gpg-agent.conf" },

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.5

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.4

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.3

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.8.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.7

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.6

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.5

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.4

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.3

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.4

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.3

2 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: aliou.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.2

3 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.1

3 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.0

3 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.4.1

3 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.4.0

3 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: aliou → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.