@almadar/evaluator
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@almadar/operators | AI (phantom-deps): @almadar/operators is intentionally included as a runtime dep for the ./operators sub-path export; it is not a phantom dependency — stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@almadar/std | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dependency; likely used transitively or re-exported within the monorepo. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is a legitimate org-scoped library; lack of Sigstore provenance is a hygiene gap, not a security disqualifier for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 39 of 39)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.12.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.12.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.12.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.10.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.10.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.7.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.7.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.4.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.4.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.4.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.4.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.4.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.3.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.3.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.1.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.16 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.15 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.14 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.13 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.12 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.10 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.9 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 3 |
v2.12.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.12.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.