@alwaysmeticulous/cli
The Meticulous CLI
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): puppeteer-core is a well-known Google-maintained package; appropriate for a browser replay/automation CLI. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package has SLSA provenance attestation; missing gitHead is a minor metadata gap, not a supply chain risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; this is the documented automated release pattern. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Transition to GitHub Actions publishing makes individual maintainer accounts redundant; consistent with CI automation. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@alwaysmeticulous/client | AI (dependencies): First-party monorepo dep from the same publisher; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@alwaysmeticulous/remote-replay-launcher | AI (dependencies): First-party monorepo dep from the same publisher; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@alwaysmeticulous/replay-orchestrator-launcher | AI (dependencies): First-party monorepo dep from the same publisher; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @alwaysmeticulous namespace; levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 188)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.290.2 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.290.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.289.2 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.289.1 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.289.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.288.2 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.288.1 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.288.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.287.2 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.287.1 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.287.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.286.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.285.2 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.285.1 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.285.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.284.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.283.2 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.283.1 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.283.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.282.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.281.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.280.1 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.280.0 | 22 / 5 | |
| 2.279.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.278.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.277.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.276.3 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.276.2 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.276.1 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.276.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.275.1 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.275.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.274.2 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.274.1 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.274.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.273.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.272.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.271.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.270.1 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.270.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.269.1 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.269.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.268.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.267.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.266.2 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.266.1 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.266.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.265.0 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.264.6 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.264.5 | 21 / 5 | |
| 2.264.4 | 21 / 5 |
v2.290.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.290.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.289.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.289.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.289.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.288.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.288.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.288.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.287.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.287.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.287.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.286.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.285.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.285.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.285.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.284.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.283.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.283.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.283.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.282.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.281.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.280.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.280.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.279.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.278.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.277.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.276.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.276.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.276.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.276.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.275.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.275.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.274.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.274.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.274.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.273.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.272.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.271.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.270.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.270.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.269.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.269.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.268.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.267.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.266.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.266.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.266.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.265.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.264.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.264.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.264.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.